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ABSTRACT
Parties often take judgment enforcement for granted in the United
States as a result of decades of reinforcement from the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. As the world becomes increasingly globalized,
however, corporate defendants may only have nominal holdings
within the United States, with the majority of their assets held
abroad. Plaintiffs may then be in for a rude awakening when they
bring their U.S. money judgments abroad, for such judgments are
routinely unenforceable. China has proven no exception, and
foreign judgments are rarely, if ever, enforced there. The problem is
compounded by the fact that trade between the United States and
China increases every year, leading to a likely corresponding
increase in cases where U.S. money judgment creditors are left
holding the bag. This Comment briefly explains the reasons for why
U.S. money judgments often go unenforced abroad—a strange
confluence of principles of federalism, comity, and Erie doctrine—
and discusses recent cases of judgment unenforceability against
Chinese parties. More importantly, however, the Comment seeks to
provide professionals with practical advice in how to plan ahead
when transactions involve foreign parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalization has provided a host of benefits to countries around
the world and offers an increasingly vast array of opportunities for
investors of all kinds to choose from.1 Nonetheless, any parties to an
international project or deal must carefully consider a range of issues

1. See, e.g., Globalization: A Brief Overview, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
(May 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/053008.htm.
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and concerns.2 Sovereignty remains a critical issue which overshadows
all disputes that may result in judicial litigation between parties of
diverse nationalities, 3 and investors and practitioners in the United
States must remember that a money judgment which cannot be enforced
is practically worthless.4
Nations’ inclinations to enforce foreign judgments vary widely and
often turn on a variety of factors.5 This Comment principally focuses
upon the notoriously difficult enforcement of U.S. money judgments
(“USMJs”) in China in light of the absence of a treaty of reciprocity for
the enforcement of judgments. In particular, holders of USMJs are in a
highly unenviable position when they discover that their Chinese
adversaries have few to no assets in the United States and that they have
few viable options in reducing their judgment into assets.6
Moreover, it appears that instances of judgment unenforceability
are no longer discrete incidents as trade increases between the United
States and China. 7 The net result of judgment unenforceability is a
limitation on trade between both nations 8 —U.S. parties are less
competitive when they must demand greater concessions to secure their
interests from their Chinese counterparts, and Chinese parties are less
attractive because such demands must be made in the first place.9
Part I of this paper first briefly discusses both the domestic and
foreign enforcement of USMJs. Part II summarizes several cases where
USMJ creditors have been stymied by the lack of judgment enforcement
in China. Part III then discusses several major factors giving rise to
judgment unenforceability in China, while Part IV discusses the
2. See, e.g., Matthew Murphy, Knowing the Chinese Market: Key Tips for
Attorneys Representing Foreign Clients Doing Business in China, in BEST PRACTICES
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA (2011 ed.), available at 2011
WL 1572016.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., Rainer Böhm & Julian Eberhardt, The Enforcement of U.S. Judgments
in Europe: A U.S. Judgment Won’t Be Worth Much in Europe if You Can’t Enforce It,
21 NO. 3 PRAC. LITIGATOR 57 (2010) (“A multi-million dollar verdict is at long last
worthless if it cannot be enforced in the country where the debtor’s assets are
located.”).
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See generally WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 3 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33536.pdf.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. See id.
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attendant ramifications. Finally, Part V provides some suggestions for
practitioners to avert enforceability issues and a discussion of a broader
policy solution through the ratification of a treaty for the mutual
enforcement of judgments.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS
Parties do not litigate for the privilege of obtaining a piece of paper
from a judge; rather, it is what the paper represents that is critical—a
judgment with the force of the law.10 Accordingly, a judgment which
cannot be enforced has little value.11
A. DOMESTIC DOCTRINE—THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Domestic enforcement of USMJs is governed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which requires state courts to recognize and enforce the
judgments of other states. 12 Thus, in theory, parties cannot avoid
judgment enforcement simply by leaving the state where the judgment
was issued. Indeed, in modern times, enforcement of USMJs within the
United States has become relatively smooth.13
Additionally, USMJ enforcement in the United States is affected by
an important corollary of the landmark federalism case Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins. 14 As all law students and legal professionals know in
practice, if not by name, Erie doctrine holds that federal courts with
subject-matter jurisdiction based solely on diversity jurisdiction must
apply state law.15 Thus, unless a federal statute is applicable, federal
courts must apply state laws regarding judgment enforcement (foreign

10.
11.
12.
13.

See Böhm & Eberhardt, supra note 4.
See id.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the
Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 114 (2007) (discussing the
history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. See id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”); see also
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)
(holding that when “jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, ‘the law to be applied . . .
is the law of the state’”) (citing Erie, 304 U.S. 64).
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or domestic). 16 This feature of U.S. jurisprudence has important
ramifications for the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States and consequently for the enforcement of USMJs abroad.17
B. INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINE—COMITY AND TREATIES OF
RECIPROCITY
Obviously, foreign nations are not obligated to enforce USMJs by
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.18 Instead, nations have traditionally
enforced foreign judgments upon the principle of comity.19 Indeed, the
United States still operates in this manner, precisely because
enforcement of judgments remains a state prerogative.20
1. Comity—Generally and in the United States
Comity has been described in a number of ways, but an exact
definition is elusive. 21 As one leading commentator has explained,
comity is both a bridge “meant to expand the role of public policy,
public law, and international politics in domestic courts . . . between
competing domestic and foreign public policies,” and a wall,
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a) (“The procedure on execution—and in proceedings
supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure
of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it
applies.”).
17. See discussion infra Part I.B.
18. Nevertheless, U.S. parties litigating abroad often seem to forget this detail. See
Rich Kuslan, What Happens When Your Chinese Supplier Says: Sure, Go Ahead, Sue
Me!, ASIABIZBLOG (July 17, 2007), http://www.asiabizblog.com/archives/2007/07/
what_happens_wh.htm.
19. See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1
(1991) (discussing the history and evolution of comity internationally).
20. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not bind states to enforce foreign
country judgments. See Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440 (distinguishing between domestic
judgments, “which are entitled to full faith and credit, and those of foreign courts,
which are subject to principles of comity”) (citations omitted). In practice, however,
states often do enforce foreign country judgments. See Brandon B. Danford, Note, The
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States and Europe: How Can
We Achieve A Comprehensive Treaty?, 23 REV. LITIG. 381, 424 (2004) (explaining that
state law continues to govern the enforcement of foreign judgments in the absence of a
federal law or a treaty); discussion infra note 32 and accompanying text; see also
discussion supra Part I.A.
21. See Paul, supra note 19, at 3–4 (providing numerous examples of attempts to
define comity).
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“containing and delimiting the public domain of the forum state’s
law.” 22 At its core, comity is a principle that addresses the inherent
tension between a state’s own sovereignty and its respect and deference
to the sovereignty of other states.23
Hilton v. Guyot was the seminal U.S. case discussing comity. 24
There, the Court stated that
‘[c]omity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
25
who are under the protection of its laws.

While Hilton is not binding authority for state courts because of
Erie doctrine,26 comity nevertheless generally prevails as the method by
which states enforce foreign judgments.27 A further consequence of the
absence of federal legislation in this area means that enforcement of

22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 6 (“Although the state is an independent and supreme body within its
own territory and over its own subjects, it is also an equal member of a community of
nations, bound to respect the rights of other sovereigns, and thus not completely
independent.”).
24. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
25. Id. at 164; see also Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440 (“Comity is a recognition
which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and
expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not
achieve the force of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation’s expression of
understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and
convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be
withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the
nation called upon to give it effect.”) (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. 113).
26. See discussion supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481
cmt. a (1987) (noting that barring a treaty, “recognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments is a matter of State law” under the Erie doctrine).
27. See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381,
386–87 (1926) (holding that Hilton is not binding authority, but nonetheless applying
the principles of comity discussed therein).

2013]

JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABILITY IN CHINA

207

foreign judgments is governed by a dizzying myriad of interpretations of
state law by both state and federal courts.28
2. Moving Away From Comity Towards Treaties
Due to the uncertainty surrounding comity, nations have
increasingly enacted treaties of reciprocity for the mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgments.29 However, because federalism prevents
the United States from enacting a uniform judgment enforcement
regime,30 and because the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating
treaties with foreign nations,31 the United States has few official treaties
of reciprocity. Thus, while states within the United States generally
honor the judgments of foreign nations,32 courts of foreign nations may
not do the same for USMJs.33 Recognition and enforcement of USMJs
in the absence of a treaty of reciprocity varies by nation;34 China, for
example, has a reputation for refusing enforcement of USMJs.35

28. Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Judgments in the United States and Europe,
13 J.L. & COM. 193, 197 (1994).
29. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?,
40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 227 (2008) (discussing the trend toward increasingly
liberalized treaties of reciprocity); see also Vishali Singal, Note, Preserving Power
Without Sacrificing Justice: Creating an Effective Reciprocity Regime for the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 943, 954–55
(2008) (“As of 2001, at least seven major U.S. trading partners—Mexico, England,
Canada, China, Japan, Spain and Germany—require reciprocity to some degree before
they will recognize and enforce a [USMJ].”) (citing ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., SURVEY ON FOREIGN RECOGNITION OF U.S. MONEY JUDGMENTS 18–20 (2001)).
30. See discussion supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. art I, §10.
32. See Volker Behr, Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L. &
COM. 211, 223 (1994) (noting that “reciprocity is generally guaranteed in the United
States”).
33. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a JudgmentsRecognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 167, 168 (1998) (explaining that while states will generally enforce foreign
judgments, “there is a perception that this favor is not reciprocated abroad”).
34. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SURVEY ON FOREIGN
RECOGNITION OF U.S. MONEY JUDGMENTS 18–20 (2001) [hereinafter NYC BAR
SURVEY] (“Without reciprocity, many of the [nations surveyed] will not recognize a
USMJ.”); see also Weintraub, supra note 33, at 220 (listing cases and articles which
discuss foreign judgment enforcement practices in different countries).
35. See Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Lawsuits Against China Companies Face Hurdles,
REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=
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It appears that, for much of the twentieth century, U.S. parties
relied upon the United States’ prominent role in international trade to
ensure the good faith of foreign parties. 36 A foreign company with
significant assets in the United States disobeys U.S. courts at its peril
precisely because USMJ creditors may attach assets wherever located in
the United States.37 Now, however, as the role of other nations grows, a
foreign party may have little incentive to litigate in the United States if it
knows that an adverse judgment cannot be effectively satisfied against it
without recourse to its home courts, where enforcement would be
wanting.38 This is a serious problem which has arisen for creditors who
hold USMJs against Chinese parties.
II. CASES OF JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABILITY IN CHINA
The following cases serve as examples of the unenforceability of
USMJs in China. In each case, the Chinese parties have few assets in
the United States and have generally been uncooperative during
litigation, if they participate at all—this is a logical consequence of
when parties believe that adverse judgments will be unenforceable
against them.39
USN1429211020110214 (quoting an attorney who has practiced in China for over 30
years: “To date I am not aware of a single case where a United States judgment has
been enforced in China”); see also Dan Harris, Will Your US Judgment Be Enforced
Abroad?
Not China, but Maybe., CHINA LAW BLOG (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2009/03/will_your_us_judgment_be_enfor.html
(“[T]here is no reason to [seek enforcement of a USMJ in China] because they have no
value there.”).
36. See Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting Americans: Holding Foreign
Manufacturers Accountable: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and
the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Louise
Ellen Tietz, Professor, Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Hearing on Holding
Foreign Manufacturers Accountable] (“Once upon a time, [enforcement] was not quite
as bad because foreign companies generally had assets in the U.S. so you could enforce
a judgment you got here against one of them here. But that, of course, has changed.
With a click of the mouse, one can move assets offshore and then you are stuck.”).
37. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 111, 114 (1998) (concluding that “the problem of recognizing American judgments
abroad tends to arise only in the event that the defendant is a fairly small business or an
individual.”). But see discussion infra note 137 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., infra note 138 and accompanying text.
39. See Jessica Seah, Decline in Securities Litigation Against U.S.-listed Chinese
Companies, THE ASIAN LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2013, www.law.com/corporatecounsel/
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A. VISIONCHINA
1. Facts of the Dispute
In the VisionChina case, a pair of private equity funds has been
unable to recover payments due to them under contract from
VisionChina Media Inc. (“VisionChina”), a publicly-traded company
incorporated in the Cayman Islands with stock traded on the
NASDAQ.40 Importantly, VisionChina’s operations as a major provider
of digital advertising on public transportation are exclusively based in
China, 41 as are the majority of its assets. 42 Digital Media Group
Company Limited (“DMG”) was a competing digital advertising
company, with its primary business operations also located in China.43
DMG’s primary shareholders (and the plaintiffs in the now-main case)
were the U.S. venture capital firms Gobi and Oak (“Gobi-Oak”).44
By the end of September 2009, DMG and VisionChina had
outlined the major provisions of a Merger Agreement.45 VisionChina
began conducting its diligence, including meeting with the executives of
DMG. 46 Under the final Merger Agreement, VisionChina would pay
$100 million in cash and stock at closing, and an additional $60 million
in cash and stock in two payments over the next two years.47
While VisionChina paid the initial $100 million, it notified GobiOak in late 2010 that it would not be paying the remainder, citing breach

PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1359299346689 (quoting Jerome Fortinsky, a Shearman
& Sterling attorney: “Chinese defendants who do not have assets in the U.S. are in a
position where they can think about simply not engaging in the litigations. . . . If they
only have interests in China, or have no interest in expanding in the U.S., they can
simply choose not to engage in litigation.”) (emphasis added).
40. See Defendants’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims at ¶ 102,
VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, No. 650526/2011
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter VisionChina Answer].
41. See Decision and Order on Motion at 3, VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder
Representative Servs., LLC, No. 652390/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter
Preliminary Decision].
42. See VisionChina Answer, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 102–03.
43. See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 3.
44. See VisionChina Answer, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 105–08.
45. See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 4.
46. See id. at 4–5.
47. See id. at 6. The Merger Agreement also contained an indemnity clause which
was to be “VisionChina’s ‘exclusive post-closing remedy.’” Id.
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of contract and misrepresentations in the Merger Agreement.48 Shortly
thereafter, each party commenced a separate suit in New York State
Court (the “VisionChina Action”49 and the “Shareholder Representative
Action”50).
2. The Preliminary Decision
The court subsequently issued a Preliminary Decision in the
VisionChina Action, effectively dismissing the VisionChina Action.51
The court also granted Gobi-Oak’s motion for an order to attach
VisionChina’s assets.52 The court found that it was “more likely than
not” that Gobi-Oak would prevail in the litigation, 53 and that it was
possible that VisionChina would not satisfy any judgment made against
it because the majority of its assets were located in China. 54 In
particular, the court made specific reference to VisionChina’s own
filings with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) which
noted that parties might have difficulty enforcing judgments against it in
China,55 and recognized that this was exacerbated by the fact that there
is no treaty between the United States and China providing for the
mutual enforcement of judgments.56 In light of these considerations, the
court levied $60 million against VisionChina in two separate
Attachment Orders, one for each deferred payment under the Merger
Agreement.57 The court later ordered VisionChina to transfer the $60
48. See id. at 7–8. Soon after the closing of the merger, auditors produced a report
showing DMG’s total revenue to be much lower than reported by DMG’s executives
and which “made clear that DMG was actually on a downward, rather than upward,
trend.” Id. at 7. However, VisionChina did not act on this information or raise concerns
until its notice to withhold payment in late 2010. See id. at 7–8.
49. VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, No.
652390/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2010).
50. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No.
650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2011).
51. See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 16.
52. See id. at 21.
53. Id. at 19.
54. See id. at 20.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 24; Order of Attachment at 2–3, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC
v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Order of Attachment].
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million in assets into an escrow account by August 21, 2012 (the
“Transfer Order”).58
3. Order for Contempt
By the deadline, VisionChina had transferred only approximately
$3.2 million into the escrow account, which VisionChina claimed was
the majority of its non-China holdings.59 As a result, in mid-October
2012, Gobi-Oak filed a motion to hold VisionChina in contempt for
deliberately failing to transfer sufficient assets. 60 In response,
VisionChina asserted that it had done all it could.61 VisionChina first
asserted that it had applied to the PRC’s State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (“S.A.F.E.”), 62 which oversees foreign investment and
transfers of currency, and whose approval would be required for any
transfer of VisionChina’s PRC assets. 63 The court ultimately found
VisionChina in contempt in early February 2013, and ordered a fine of
$250 and Gobi-Oak’s counsel fees incurred in connection with the
contempt order.64
4. Subsequent Appeal
In June 2013, the New York Appellate Division affirmed much of
the lower court’s decision, including the dismissal of VisionChina’s

58. See Order, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc.,
No. 650526/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31, 2012). VisionChina’s appeal of the Transfer
Order was denied. See Order Denying Motion to Stay, S’holder Representative Servs.,
LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. M-3829 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 2, 2012).
59. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Contempt at 1, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No.
650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Defendants’ MOL].
60. See Affidavit of Thomas J. Kavaler in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Contempt, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No.
650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012).
61. See Defendants’ MOL, supra note 59, at 9.
62. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
63. See Defendants’ MOL, supra note 59, at 1–2.
64. See Order to Punish for Contempt, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v.
VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013). VisionChina has
since appealed the order for contempt. See Notice of Appeal, S’holder Representative
Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2013).
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actions and the summary judgment in favor of Gobi-Oak’s breach of
contract claims.65
Notably, however, the Appellate Division reversed the Attachment
Order. 66 The Appellate Division found nothing in the record which
indicated that S.A.F.E. would hinder an application by VisionChina to
remit $60 million to Gobi-Oak.67 Furthermore, the Appellate Division
found nothing in the record indicating that VisionChina was “secreting
property or removing it from New York,” and also found that Gobi-Oak
had not demonstrated that there was a “real identifiable risk” that
VisionChina would be unable or unwilling to satisfy any adverse
judgment against it.”68
5. Conclusions
Regardless, as the lower court suggested, the need for the
Attachment Orders and the Transfer Order would likely be obviated if
U.S. judgments could be easily enforced in China (in this case, either the
Transfer Order or else some future money judgment). 69 Instead, the
court’s concerns were realized, as VisionChina transferred only about $3
million into the escrow.70 It is certainly possible that VisionChina was
hindered by China’s bureaucracy 71 and was unable to meet the tight
deadlines established by the court.72 On the other hand, VisionChina
had over a year to produce sufficient assets, made no other attempts to

65. VisionChina Media Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., LLC, 967 N.Y.S.2d
338, 342 (App. Div. 2013).
66. Id. at 347.
67. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 346–47 (citations omitted).
69. See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 20.
70. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt at 4,
S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012); see also Judgment for Partial Summary Judgment, S’holder
Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 16, 2013) (awarding over $71 million to Gobi-Oak, which was not reduced by any
escrow amounts, once the Appellate Division reversed the attachment orders).
71. An admittedly serious problem, see discussion infra Part III.A.
72. However, it does not appear that VisionChina ever requested an extension of
time to satisfy the Attachment Orders. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt at 6 n.4, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v.
VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).
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satisfy the Attachment Orders from its Chinese assets,73 opposed GobiOak’s suggestion to establish an escrow account in China denominated
in RMB,74 and proposed no alternative solutions.75 Whatever the reason,
it seems increasingly unlikely that Gobi-Oak will recover its $60
million, at least through U.S. courts.76
B. SECURITIES LITIGATION
Chinese corporations have also been subjected to securities class
action litigation in the United States. Since 2011, an increasing number
of Chinese companies have come under scrutiny by investors and the
SEC.77 However, settlements in such cases are both less frequent and
smaller than in average federal securities class action lawsuits.78 Some
practitioners believe that this is a direct result of the difficulties of
litigating and enforcing judgments against Chinese companies, 79 with
some pointing out that Chinese companies have little incentive to litigate
in the United States if they have few assets outside of China and have no
intentions of expanding.80
73. The first attachment order was issued on October 12, 2011. See Preliminary
Decision, supra note 41, at 24. The second attachment order was issued on December
1, 2011. See Order of Attachment, supra note 57. The order for contempt was officially
issued on February 1, 2013. See Order to Punish for Contempt, S’holder Representative
Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).
74. See Defendants’ MOL, supra note 59, at 14.
75. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Contempt
at 4, S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v. VisionChina Media Inc., No. 650526/11
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).
76. Moreover, there are no known pending suits in China against VisionChina,
which may indicate a lack of confidence in that nation’s judicial system. See discussion
infra Part III.B.
77. See Matthew Close, Securities Litigation Against Chinese Companies: Next
Stop Canada?, BLOOMBERGLAW.COM, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitionercontributions/litigation-against-chinese-companies/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
78. See Seah, supra note 39.
79. See, e.g., id. (“Mimi Yang, a Shanghai-based litigation counsel at Ropes &
Gray, attributes the smaller settlements to the difficulty of litigating against Chinese
companies. She calls it the ‘China discount,’ explaining, ‘It is very hard to enforce a
U.S. judgment on China soil.’”) (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., id. (quoting Jerome Fortinsky, a Shearman Sterling attorney:
“Chinese defendants who do not have assets in the U.S. are in a position where they can
think about simply not engaging in the litigations. . . . If they only have interests in
China, or have no interest in expanding in the U.S., they can simply choose not to
engage in litigation.”) (emphasis added).
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1. ZST Digital Networks—California Litigation
A recent example has revolved around ZST Digital Networks, a
Delaware corporation with its main offices in China.81 ZST primarily
supplies digital cable equipment and provides GPS services in China.82
In October 2009, ZST filed registration documents with the SEC for an
initial public offering that same month.83 Over the next several years,
ZST suffered from attacks by short-sellers and the resignation of its
auditors.84 Finally, in April 2011, shareholders filed a securities class
action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(the “California Action”).85 The complaint alleged that ZST had issued
materially false and misleading information in its offering documents
and SEC filings. 86 Eventually, the California Action was settled in
March 2013, with the settlement finalized in August 2013.87
2. ZST Digital Networks—Delaware Litigation
While the California Action was underway, other shareholders
brought a separate action against ZST in Delaware Court of Chancery,88
demanding access to the company’s books and records (the “Delaware
Action”).89 As with the California Action, the plaintiffs in the Delaware
Action sought access to company documents due to the allegations of
fraud and concerns regarding changes in management.90

81. See Complaint at ¶ 13, Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., No. 11-03531
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter ZST California Complaint].
82. See id.
83. See id. at ¶¶ 1–4.
84. See Michael Rapoport, Novel Relief for China Woes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324883604578394543306948
924.html (summarizing the facts of the case and the decision).
85. See Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., No. 11-03531 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
2011).
86. See ZST California Complaint, supra note 81, at ¶ 7.
87. See Memorandum & Order Regarding Motions for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, Award of Attorney’s Fees, and Reimbursement of Expenses, Scott
v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., No. 11-3531 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2013).
88. C.A. No. 8014 (Del. Ch. 2012).
89. See Verified Complaint for Inspection of Books and Records Pursuant to 8 Del.
C. § 220, Deutsch v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 8014 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7,
2012).
90. See id. at ¶ 28.
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On December 11, 2012, the court in the Delaware Action entered a
final order requiring ZST to provide plaintiffs with access to books and
records.91 After failing to comply with the court’s order, the court held
ZST in contempt and granted the lead plaintiff a put option against the
company’s shares, which have continued to plunge. 92 As one
professional explained, ”[t]his likely is a strategy that provides paper
satisfaction but no substantive satisfaction or relief for U.S. investors.”93
In fact, some professionals believe that there is an increasing trend
among troubled Chinese companies to allow their U.S.-based securities
to lose value so that they can be privately acquired at a lower cost.94
Perhaps more significantly, the court also appointed a receiver to
access ZST’s books and to obtain and liquidate property for the
plaintiffs. 95 As of May 2013, the receiver claimed to have obtained
control of ZST subsidiaries abroad and access to bank accounts in Hong
Kong. 96 The receiver was also looking to access bank accounts in
China.97 Prior to that, the ZST receiver had obtained access to financial
records in New York from ZST’s auditor and from its executives.98 The
receiver has stated that he has sought to recover abroad assets on
“multiple fronts.”99 While unclear if the receiver will ultimately be able
to transfer ZST’s assets back to the United States, the Court of
Chancery’s solution signals a possible alternative for U.S. parties
seeking to enforce their judgments abroad.100

91. See Final Order, Deutsch v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 8014 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 11, 2012).
92. See Rapoport, supra note 84.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See Order Appointing Receiver, Deutsch v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., C.A.
No. 8014 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2013).
96. See Rapoport, supra note 84.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Recently, ZST Digital has demonstrated a desire to settle the issue. The
outcome of such discussions remains to be seen. See Michael Rapoport, China’s ZST
Shows Willingness to Settle U.S. Investor’s Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323455104579017123633536390.htm
l.
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C. CHINESE DRYWALL CASES
A final example of judgment unenforceability against Chinese
parties is the main Chinese Drywall case 101 where thousands of
homeowners have complained of serious health issues and deterioration
of their homes’ infrastructure resulting from contaminated Chinese
drywall.102
One lead case, Germano v. Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd., emerged in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.103
As found by the court, Chinese drywall was used extensively in homes
across the United States since as early as 2004. 104 Soon thereafter,
homeowners started to complain of significant corrosion in their homes,
as well as emissions of gases, followed by complaints of illnesses.105
Once it was determined that the Chinese drywall was to blame, actions
were filed in various state and federal courts, and eventually
consolidated in Louisiana.106
Among the parties complained against were the Chinese
manufacturer, European affiliates, and U.S. distributors.107 Because the
Chinese manufacturer did not appear in the litigation, the court granted a
default judgment against it.108 The court discussed and determined the
damages due to various individual plaintiffs, ultimately awarding over
$2.6 million in damages.109
However, as this Comment has discussed, receiving a judgment and
enforcing a judgment are two very different issues. While settlements
have been reached with both the U.S. distributor of the drywall110 and,
101. See In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 706 F. Supp. 2d
655 (E.D. La. 2010).
102. See Leslie Wayne, Thousands of Homeowners Cite Drywall for Ills, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/business/
08drywall.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. A great deal of ancillary litigation concerning
defective Chinese drywall has developed, principally regarding insurance coverage.
103. 706 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. La. 2010).
104. See id. at 659.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.; see also Arthur F. Roeca, Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation, in 2 TOXIC
TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 23:14 (James T. O’Reilly ed., 2012).
109. See 706 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
110. See Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Stinky Settlement: Lowe’s to Pay $6.5M to Settle
Claims Over Smelly Drywall, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug. 18, 2010),
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perhaps more significantly, a German affiliate of the Chinese
manufacturer, 111 commentators generally agree that no plaintiffs are
likely to recover from the Chinese manufacturers’ Chinese assets. 112
Furthermore, there are no indications that these judgments have been or
will be enforced in China.113
It thus seems plausible that these cases (and their attendant costs)
would largely be obviated if the Chinese corporations had significant
attachable assets in the United States.
III. FACTORS GIVING RISE TO JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABILITY IN
CHINA
Foreign corporations have historically encountered numerous
difficulties while doing business in China, 114 and judgment

http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202470199576&slreturn
=20130220151906; see also Jef Feely & Allen Johnson Jr., Chinese Drywall Maker to
Pay Homeowners to Settle Contamination Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-15/chinese-drywall-maker-knaufplasterboard-agrees-to-800-million-settlement.html (discussing the settlements paid by
a German subsidiary of a Chinese drywall company in a related action).
111. See Feely & Johnson Jr., supra note 110; see also Allen Johnson Jr. & William
McQuillen, Chinese Drywall Accord to Repair Damaged Homes Wins U.S. Judge’s
Approval, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2010-10-14/chinese-drywall-accord-endorsed-by-judge-knauf-to-help-repair-300houses.html.
112. See Andrew Martin, Turning Point for Suits Over Chinese Drywall, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/business/chinese-drywalllawsuits-at-a-turning-point.html?pagewanted=all; see also Hearing on Holding Foreign
Manufacturers Accountable, supra note 36 (“[S]o many of the manufacturers have no
assets in the U.S.”).
113. See generally Dan Harris, Chinese Drywall Cases. Show Me the Money!,
CHINA LAW BLOG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2009/04/
chinese_drywall_taint_no_big_t.html (“US judgments are of virtually no value in
China. Put simply, Chinese courts simply do not recognize them for anything. They
cannot be converted to a Chinese judgment and they are not even evidence of anything.
. . . Nothing has changed [in the drywall cases] and I cannot see how a US judgment
against a Chinese drywall manufacturer will have any value, unless the Chinese drywall
manufacturer has assets in the United States or in some third country that will enforce
the US judgment.”).
114. See Laurie Burkitt & Paul Mozur, Foreign Firms Brace for More Pressure in
China, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323916304578400463208890042; see also The World Bank,
Economy Rankings, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last
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unenforceability may be yet another. 115 If U.S. parties could easily
satisfy their judgments in China, it is likely that the cases discussed in
Part II would have been resolved. This, however, is not the case, and
several factors may explain why.
A. BUREAUCRACY AND PROTECTIONISM
A long cited difficulty of doing business in China has been
navigating its bureaucracy,116 which hinders the transfer of assets and
impedes judgment enforcement. For example, one could plausibly
accept VisionChina’s assertions that it was hampered by the Chinese
bureaucracy from transferring assets offshore to satisfy the Attachment
Orders (or, later, an adverse judgment).117 Bureaucratic interference is
pervasive at all levels of the Chinese government, not the least of which
is due to the fact that the government owns many companies important
to their local communities, 118 and because of the broad discretion
Chinese agencies are afforded for the interpretation of law. 119 As a
result, China’s bureaucracy creates obstacles to enforcement and raises
visited Sept. 27, 2013); Linette Lopez, The 10 Biggest Problems With Doing Business
In China, BUSINESS INSIDER, Oct. 24, 2011.
115. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in
China From a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
757, 758 (2004) (explaining that the “enforcement of foreign judgments in China has
been notoriously difficult in recent years,” and that a “large percentage of judgments,
both domestic and foreign, are never enforced”); see also Kolker, supra note 35;
Kuslan, supra note 18 (“Don’t expect you can take an American judgment against a
Chinese company to China and sue upon it. Your American judgment will not be
recognized.”).
116. See Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 41
(2006) (“The arbitrariness of China’s bureaucracy is legendary among all who have
encountered it, foreign and Chinese alike.”); see also Josh Brown, Bureaucracy In
China an Issue but Profits Good, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/22/bureaucracy-in-china-an-issuebut-profits-good/.
117. See State Administration of Foreign Exchange, GOV.CN (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://english.gov.cn/2005-10/09/content_75318.htm (one of S.A.F.E.’s principal duties
is to regulate “foreign exchange transactions under capital account[s]”).
118. See Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of
the Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 91 (2002) (explaining
the impact of “government interference in favor of state-owned enterprises,” which
“may not sell or be forced to sell [their] assets to satisfy a court judgment”).
119. See Lubman, supra note 116, at 41.

2013]

JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABILITY IN CHINA

219

tremendous legal uncertainty for both foreign and domestic parties.120
As will be discussed, this uncertainty increases the costs for parties
doing business with China.121
A related problem in China has been protectionism, both by courts
and agencies.122 Indeed, there are indications that protectionism is an
important reason why judgments (foreign and domestic) go unenforced
in China. 123 Indeed, only about 20-50% of Chinese judgments are
enforced in China 124 —it stands to reason that foreign judgments are
even less likely to survive. 125 And in fact, commentators have cited
protectionism as the main reason that U.S. parties have had difficulties
in recovering in the Chinese Drywall cases.126
B. LEGAL SYSTEM
Related to both bureaucracy and protectionism, China is also
infamous for its labyrinthine judicial process.127 Chinese courts have
120. See id. at 42 (positing that the main aspects of Chinese bureaucracy that
promote legal uncertainty are personalized rule throughout the government hierarchy
and the fragmented nature of the bureaucracy).
121. See discussion infra Part IV.
122. See Francisco Soler Caballero, The New Environment in China: Adapting to the
Changes in International Business Transactions, in BEST PRACTICES FOR
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA, (2011 ed.), available at 2011 WL
1572015. Of course, protectionism is a problem not limited to China, and may also
provide China with more costs than benefits. See generally Robert W. McGee, The Cost
of Protectionism: Should the Law Favor Producers or Consumers?, 23 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 529, 555 (1993) (discussing the numerous costs for countries which enact
protectionism policies, including “reduced standard[s] of living,” lost employment, and
social costs).
123. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System:
The Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 41 (1996) (“Local
protectionism is far and away the most frequently mentioned obstacle [to enforcement
of Chinese civil judgments].”).
124. See id. at 28 (finding that enforcement of domestic judgments in China stood at
about 20-50%).
125. See id.
126. See 124 AM. JUR. Trials § 31 (2012) (noting that the few feasible remedies
available to the Chinese Drywall plaintiffs are “extremely expensive [to obtain]”
because “the process is difficult and cumbersome to American plaintiff’s lawyers who
are unfamiliar with the [relevant] laws and protocols,” and that, moreover, the Chinese
manufacturers may be protected by sovereign immunity) (footnotes omitted).
127. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 763 (noting that to “many foreigners (and
probably to many Chinese as well), the People’s Courts are mysterious, arbitrary, and
unpredictable,” and that it “would not be fair to blame foreigners for being ‘biased,’ as
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been accused of abuses of discretion 128 and a general lack of
independence.129
Chinese courts have similarly been accused of protectionism when
refusing to enforce foreign judgments, particularly because recognition
must first be made at the local level.130 The inherent differences (and
therefore, assumptions) between the judicial systems of the United
States and China further exacerbate the issue of judgment
unenforceability.131
USMJs may also be difficult to enforce because the United States
and China do not have a treaty of reciprocity for the mutual enforcement
of judgments.132 This thesis holds particular weight because the absence
of such a treaty is often cited as a reason denying enforcement of a
judgment, 133 and because arbitration awards are generally enforced in
China.134
Bureaucracy, protectionism, and a convoluted judicial system are
well-known difficulties of doing business with China, and a number of
other factors may contribute as well. 135 Moreover, even if a USMJ

Chinese law, especially in the context of enforcement of foreign judgments, is often
sketchy, skeletal, and replete with ambiguity”).
128. See Zhang, supra note 118, at 92 (explaining that lower courts will abuse their
discretion, even in the enforcement of arbitral awards).
129. See id. (discussing the lack of judicial independence in China).
130. See id. at 91; see also NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 29, at 25 (“[A] separate
proceeding [at a local court] appears to be required before the recognition proceeding
can be instituted.”).
131. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 768 (“Because China is essentially a country with
a civil-law tradition the basic understanding of the U.S.’s common law legal system
should not be assumed.”).
132. See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 20; supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
133. See NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 29, at 19 (“If there is no [treaty of]
reciprocity, the Chinese court can refuse to recognize the USMJ.”).
134. Dan Harris, Arbitration in China. Get Used to it, CHINA LAW BLOG (Sept. 22,
2011) http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/09/arbitration_in_china.html [hereinafter
Harris, Arbitration in China] (explaining that “Chinese courts will almost certainly
enforce your arbitration award by converting it into a court judgment”).
135. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 758–59 (listing other factors that may give rise to
judgment unenforceability, such as “the lack of judicial independence in China, . . . the
unimaginable social consequences of bankrupting state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
[and] the paucity of necessary legal provisions curbing debtor fraud and facilitating
judgment collection”).
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creditor somehow bypasses all of these issues, Chinese parties can easily
hide within China itself by transferring assets between bank accounts.136
The cases discussed in Part II are yet another reminder of the costs
of doing business in China. However, these costs will not go unnoticed
forever, and judgment unenforceability presents serious ramifications
for business between the United States and China.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABILITY
As trade and business increase between the United States and
China,137 incidents such as those discussed in Part II seem likely to rise
as well.138 However, as has been shown in Part III, USMJ creditors may
encounter numerous difficulties when trying to satisfy their judgments
against Chinese defendants.139
The net result of unenforceability is that Chinese parties in China
are essentially judgment-proof. Some commentators have gone so far as
to suggest that Chinese parties have taken advantage of this status by
utilizing stalling tactics during litigation in the United States so that
otherwise readily-attachable international assets can be transferred back
to China. 140 It seems a rational (if disingenuous) choice to refuse to
engage in, or to stall litigation, in the United States, if a Chinese
corporation has little to lose by doing so.141 For example, VisionChina

136. See Zhang, supra note 118, at 91 (noting the difficulty in obtaining financial
information about Chinese judgment debtors and who can easily evade judgments by
transferring assets within the country).
137. See THE US-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, CHINA AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:
ADVANCING A WINNING TRADE AGENDA (2013), available at http://www.uschina.org/
sites/default/files/uscbc-trade-agenda-report.pdf. China’s growing importance in the
global economy is clear. See Zhang, supra note 118, at 62 (noting that as China’s
economy expands, it has “generated more transnational business transactions and
foreign investment”).
138. See generally Dan Harris, Why United States Lawsuits Against Chinese
Companies Are Trending Up. Just Follow the Money., CHINA LAW BLOG (July 23,
2010) http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/07/why_united_states_lawsuits_against_
chinese_companies_are_trending_up_just_follow_the_money.html.
139. See discussion supra Part III.
140. See Dan Harris, Chinese Drywall Litigation and Why Seizing Assets Is Very
Different From Seizing Ships, CHINA LAW BLOG (Feb. 28, 2010),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/02/chinese_drywall_and_the_halfas.html
[hereinafter Harris, Chinese Drywall Litigation] (discussing possible defensive
strategies that Chinese corporations may employ during U.S. litigation).
141. See Seah, supra note 39.
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had few assets outside of China and was faced with a high likelihood of
an adverse judgment. 142 It seems plausible that much of the escrow
issue (and possibly, the case) could have been resolved had there been
more attachable assets. 143 However, there is the worrying possibility
that even those Chinese parties with significant U.S.-based assets may
engage in stalling tactics during U.S. litigation to buy time to withdraw
those assets.144
Ultimately, it is unlikely that individual Chinese parties will feel
the effects of their actions. Instead, future parties (Chinese and U.S.)
will bear the costs as a moral hazard problem develops.145
A. INCREASED TRANSACTION COSTS
As a general principle, economists favor the minimization of
unnecessary transaction costs, which waste resources that may be better
devoted elsewhere.146 As discussed, transaction costs can arise from the
uncertainty that is a consequence of unenforceability of judgments.147
It is clear that doing business with China can be quite difficult.148 If
business is further complicated because U.S. parties do not trust Chinese
parties to satisfy their judgments, then transaction costs are likely to

142.
143.
144.
145.

See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 19.
See generally id.
See Harris, Chinese Drywall Litigation, supra note 140.
See Yuan, supra note 115, at 758 (noting that the “difficulty of enforcing
foreign judgments has become a major concern of foreign business, and has diminished
the confidence it may have had in China’s judicial system”).
146. See generally David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of
Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction,
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 105 (2005) (“We want to bring the parties to transactions together
as cheaply as possible. In that sense, we do want to minimize transaction costs. But we
want to reduce them to the lowest level needed to perform the function of facilitating
sufficient communication to realize beneficial transactions. We do not really mean that
we want to, or should, eliminate transaction costs. We mean that we want to realize
transaction cost functions that we find important at the lowest possible price.”).
147. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Toward A New Model of Consumer Protection: The
Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1644 n.30
(2006) (providing a compilation of articles defining and discussing transaction costs in
the context of the Coase theorem); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A
Primer On the Coase Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero Transaction Costs, 11
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 20 (discussing other sources of transaction costs).
148. See discussion supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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rise. 149 Uncertainty and risk breed transaction costs, and judgment
unenforceability is no different. 150 Because Chinese parties are
effectively judgment-proof, mistakes made during transactions are more
costly.
Thus, more money must be expended to safeguard
investments.151 It also seems plausible that particularly wary investors
would make these same demands of even those Chinese parties with
significant easily-attachable assets.
Some commentators have labeled this phenomenon the “China
discount.”152 The ultimate effect of this phenomenon is that U.S. parties
become less competitive in China and Chinese parties become less
attractive to U.S. investors.153

149. See Friedrich Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments In Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (1988) [hereinafter Juenger, Money
Judgments] (explaining that difficulties arising from recognition (and therefore,
enforcement) of judgments “punishes private litigants and exacts a toll from
international commerce,” and therefore, to “protect their interests, parties engaged in
multinational transactions must either resort to arbitration or insist on advance
payments or guarantees, which increase the transaction costs of doing business
abroad”).
150. See Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgments in the
People’s Republic of China: What the American Lawyer Needs to Know, 23 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 241, 242 (1997) (“Creating a feeling of certainty and stability in law and
procedure is necessary for a nation to succeed in encouraging foreign economic
investment within its borders.”).
151. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 782 (explaining that the additional measures that
parties will be required to use to secure their assets “will surely increase the cost of
doing business with China”). As an attorney for Gobi-Oak suggested, parties could try
to demand the creation of an escrow account in the United States for the purposes of
future payments (instead of relying on the Chinese party to pay out from its Chinabased assets), or insist on arbitration agreements, the awards of which will often be
enforced in China. See discussion infra Part V.A.
152. See Seah, supra note 39; see also supra text accompanying note 78.
153. See generally David Patrick Eich, Private Equity M&A In China, in BEST
PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON
UNDERSTANDING CHANGING LAWS AND TRENDS, NAVIGATING THE REVIEW AND
APPROVAL PROCESS, AND IDENTIFYING THE KEY STEPS IN A SUCCESSFUL M AND A
TRANSACTION (2008), available at 2008 WL 5689094 (“China is a highly regulated
environment and serial acquirers that are familiar with M&A in more liberalized
regulatory environments typically will be frustrated by the additional transaction costs
entailed.”).
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B. ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS
Companies in countries with a poor reputation of enforcing debts
and judgments may find themselves facing barriers to access foreign
capital.154 As U.S. capital markets still seem to provide advantages that
Chinese companies may wish to access,155 it follows that a Chinese party
which does not concede to a U.S. party’s demands will be forced to
accept less favorable terms (from that party or another) or else seek
capital elsewhere.156 This may be exacerbated by the fact that some U.S.
financial institutions have been sued by USMJ creditors of Chinese
companies, particularly in the securities litigation cases, for their failure
to adequately investigate those companies.157 These institutions may in
turn demand greater disclosure from, or provide less favorable financing
to, Chinese parties in the future.158
C. DIMINISHED ACCESS TO U.S. CONSUMERS
U.S. consumers, as in the Chinese drywall cases, also have some
power over Chinese corporations who wish to sell to U.S. markets.
Aside from greater product costs, which may result from using better
materials, diminished profits from lowered margins, and outright

154. See generally Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the
Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 652 (2009) (“A firm
that repeatedly accesses the credit market has an economic interest to develop a
reputation as a ‘good’ borrower. If the borrower can benefit (for example, through
fewer covenants or a lower real cost of capital), then—even if not contractually
obligated to do so—it has an incentive to act in a manner consistent with the lender’s
interests. Lenders may, in turn, begin to relax their reliance on covenants and
monitoring in loans to borrowers with established reputations.”).
155. See Seah, supra note 39 (noting that “certain Chinese companies, especially in
the technology sector, may still see greater liquidity in the U.S., thanks to the larger
U.S. investor and analyst community,” and that it is “still easier to list in America than
Asia”).
156. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 782 (explaining that the difficulty in enforcing
judgments in China “will naturally affect [foreign parties’] decision[s] to continue to
invest in or trade with China”).
157. See Seah, supra note 39 (discussing that USMJ creditors in securities litigation
cases “have sought compensation from “investment banks that took U.S.-listed Chinese
companies public” and “auditors that performed checks on disclosure”).
158. See generally id. (noting that it may take time for United States investors “to
regain confidence in Chinese companies”).
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product bans,159 Chinese businesses may simply suffer from a negative
reputation. Moreover, Congress has begun to investigate accountability
issues with defective Chinese products.160
Thus, while it is possible that cases of USMJ unenforceability
against Chinese parties may be discrete, increasing trade and business
between the nations suggest otherwise.161 Indeed, we may be seeing the
ramifications of unenforceability already manifesting in the United
States.162
V. SOLUTIONS TO UNENFORCEABILITY
Much of the problem of judgment unenforceability within China
must be resolved by China itself. There is likely a limit to how much
abuse international parties will take before withdrawing their business
from China,163 or before foreign governments interfere to protect their
citizens’ interests. 164 Judgment enforceability reform in China would
also likely invite greater investment and international business by
reducing transaction costs.165 Fortunately, the United States and China
appear to be cooperating on easing legal obstacles to business to some
degree, such as through visiting programs for Chinese practitioners.166

159. See Wayne, supra note 102 (noting that the Consumer Product Safety
Commission has banned Chinese drywall from entering the U.S.).
160. See, e.g., Hearing on Holding Foreign Manufacturers Accountable, supra note
36.
161. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
162. See Seah, supra note 39 (noting that it may take time “for American investors
to regain confidence in Chinese companies”); see also Yuan, supra note 115, at 782
(“[T]he failure to collect on judgments will generate direct losses for foreign parties,
which will naturally affect their decision to continue to invest in or trade with China.”).
163. See Linette Lopez, A Group of American Investors Say They’re Living a
Nightmare Since They Sold Their Business to a Chinese Company, BUSINESS INSIDER,
Mar. 14, 2013 (quoting a general partner at Oak Investment Partners regarding the
VisionChina case: “[I]f VisionChina does not meet its legal obligations, we believe
China will be sending a message that it is a hostile, risky and unfair place for
investment by foreign-owned businesses”).
164. For example, the SEC has become involved in both the VisionChina and ZST
Digital cases. See, e.g., SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC Letter to
VisionChina Requesting Financial Documents, Dec. 14, 2012.
165. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
166. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET: 23RD U.S.-CHINA JOINT
COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE (Dec. 19, 2012) (describing the work of the
U.S.-China Legal Exchange).
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A. SOLUTIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
1. Pre-Planning
Working with Chinese parties requires more careful forward
planning and contract drafting than for comparable transactions in the
United States. 167 For example, parties should seriously consider
establishing escrow accounts outside of China from which payments
would be disbursed. 168 This circumvents the problem of seeking to
enforce money judgments in China by placing attachable assets
elsewhere. Parties may also consider receiving full payments at closing
(appropriately discounted), though cash flow limitations may obviously
discourage such agreements.
2. Seizure of Assets
As has been discussed thoroughly throughout this Comment,
enforcing a judgment against a Chinese party with few assets in the
United States is a daunting task.
However, seizure of assets
nevertheless remains a possible (if unlikely) option—indeed, the efforts
of the receiver in ZST may provide a valuable proof-of-concept for
future parties.169
One practitioner has outlined several methods to attempt, such as
by seizing assets that may be owed to the Chinese party by U.S.
companies or by seizing assets in countries that will generally enforce
USMJs.170 Moreover, seeking enforcement of an arbitration award may
prove to be more successful.

167. See Janet Jie Tang, What You Must Know Before Doing Mergers and
Acquisitions in Mainland China, in BEST PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
IN CHINA 1, 5 (2011 ed.), available at 2008 WL 5689090 (“[S]eeking solid legal advice
is necessary in doing any China-based deal. Without full compliance with Chinese law,
your deal may be challenged at any point of the transaction.”). Nonetheless, additional
transactions costs are preferable to litigation.
168. See Manuel E. Maisog, Mergers and Acquisitions in China: Some Legal and
Policy Perspectives for Business Strategists, in BEST PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA 21 (2011 ed.), available at 2008 WL 5689095 (“Keep as much
of the ownership and control structure offshore as possible.”).
169. See discussion supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
170. Such as South Korea, Canada, or Hong Kong. See Dan Harris, How to Collect
on a U.S. Judgment Against a Chinese Company, CHINA LAW BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010),
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3. Arbitration Clauses
The inclusion of arbitration clauses is also recommended. 171
Arbitration has become the preferred mode of international commercial
dispute resolution for a variety of reasons,172 not least of which are the
far greater enforceability of arbitral awards173 and the greater likelihood
that disputes will be resolved neutrally. 174 While there are some
disadvantages inherent in the current paradigm of international
commercial arbitration, 175 arbitration nonetheless remains the most
effective means of keeping one’s investments safe,176 barring a major
shift in U.S. and Chinese policy.

http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/08/how_to_collect_on_a_us_judgment_against_a_
chinese_company.html.
171. See generally Harris, Arbitration in China, supra note 134.
172. See 81 AM. JUR. Trials § 3 (2001) (“Arbitration clauses are so commonly found
in international contracts that the U.S. Supreme Court deemed them to be ‘an almost
indispensable precondition.’”) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
507 (1974)).
173. See Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction
for International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 133, 139 (2006) (“Arbitration also
possesses a clear advantage over litigation [in China] as a result of the ability to enforce
arbitration awards . . . .”); see also Am. Arbitration Ass’n, New Study Reports
Multinational Corporations Prefer International Arbitration to Litigation, 61-JUL
DISP. RESOL. J. 12, 12 (2006) (noting that among the most highly-rated reasons for
preferring arbitration over litigation “is the enforceability of awards”).
174. See 81 AM. JUR. Trials § 4 (2001). There are a number of other advantages to
arbitration over litigation such as flexibility over procedures, informality, and greater
likelihood of preservation of relationships. See id.
175. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, supra note 173, at 12; see also 81 AM. JUR. Trials §
3 (2001) (“[D]isadvantages include the uncertainty of obtaining emergency interim
relief, anxiety over a compromised result, limited discovery, difficulty in obtaining
subpoenas, [and] narrow judicial review.”). Studies also indicate that arbitration is
generally only more cost-effective for larger and more complex cases. See Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, supra note 173, at 12.
176. Of course, the effectiveness of arbitration is dependent on U.S. parties adhering
carefully to the provisions outlined in their arbitration provisions. For example, even
taking the seemingly innocuous and cautious action of answering a complaint in a
Chinese judicial proceeding may invalidate an arbitration clause. See Chua, supra note
173, at 141 (discussing that the appropriate response in such a situation is to “challenge
the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of the arbitration agreement”).
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B. TREATIES OF RECIPROCITY
As the VisionChina court noted, the United States and China do not
have a treaty of reciprocity for the mutual enforcement of judgments.177
In China (as with many other nations), the lack of such a treaty can be a
reason to deny enforcement.178 The absence of such a treaty also shifts
the burden of demonstrating reciprocity onto U.S. parties,179 who may
have difficulty explaining the nuances of Erie doctrine to foreign
courts.180
Ratification of such a treaty, however, could be difficult. A
significant uncertainty is whether Congress truly has the constitutional
power to ratify such treaties because of federalism concerns.181 Bilateral
and multilateral treaties have been proposed before (including with
China) to no avail, 182 and the costs of ratifying a treaty may also
arguably outweigh its benefits.183 Some commentators also suggest that
treaties of reciprocity with the United States are wanting because of the

177.
178.

See Preliminary Decision, supra note 41, at 20.
See NYC BAR SURVEY, supra note 29, at 19–25 (“After a request to recognize
a USMJ is made, the Chinese court will first enter its own judgment based on the
principle of reciprocity. If there is no reciprocity, the Chinese court can refuse to
recognize the USMJ.”).
179. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Judgments in the United States and
Europe, 13 J.L. & COM. 193, 200 (1994); see also Rachel B. Korsower, Matusevitch v.
Telnikoff: The First Amendment Travels Abroad, Preventing Recognition and
Enforcement of a British Libel Judgment, 19 MD. J. INT’L. L. & TRADE 225, 237 (1995)
(“[T]he fact that the United States does not have a uniform federal law in this area
makes it difficult for an American litigant to satisfy foreign reciprocity requirements.”).
180. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 781.
181. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 238–39 (2d
ed. 1996) (suggesting that an inevitable consequence of federalism is that states are
charged with the enforcement of judgments); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., supra note 26 (noting that, barring a treaty,
“recognition and enforcement of foreign country judgments is a matter of State law”
under the Erie doctrine).
182. See, e.g., Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of
State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference (May 5, 1992)
(Hague Conference Doc. No. L.c. ON No 15 (92)), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/65973.pdf (proposing that the Hague Conference “resume
work in the field of recognition and enforcement of judgments with a view to preparing
a single convention to which Hague Conference Member States and other countries
might become parties”).
183. See Juenger, Money Judgments, supra note 149.
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perception that U.S. courts too often grant excessive awards and
disregard international law.184 Finally, it is not obvious that China (or
most nations) would even desire a treaty with the United States, because
the status quo lies in their favor.185
Nonetheless, a treaty of reciprocity seems to be the most effective
means of resolving the issue of judgment unenforceability in China.186
While the constitutional issues remain unaddressed, the United States
does have some treaties of reciprocity,187 and any uniform law requiring
enforcement could be restricted to foreign judgments (thus
circumventing the federalism issues). Indeed, as Chinese judgments are
already routinely enforced within the United States, 188 a uniform law
would merely act as codification of the status quo.
The advantages of a treaty would also likely exceed its costs.
Transaction costs will be reduced if there is greater certainty for both
U.S. and Chinese parties that judgments will be enforced by way of a
treaty.189 While bureaucracy and local protectionism remain concerns,
Chinese courts appear to respect the gravitas of an official treaty.190 For
example, arbitration awards, which are governed by the New York
Convention, are already generally enforced in China. 191 An official
treaty would also deprive courts of an excuse to deny judgment
enforcement. Moreover, as trade between the United States and China
continues to increase, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that
cases of judgment unenforceability will increase as well. As such, the
costs of not having treaties of reciprocity grow each year. And while
184. See Nadja Vietz, Will Your U.S. Judgment Be Enforced Abroad?, WA. STATE
BAR NEWS, Mar. 2009, at 15.
185. See Danford, supra note 20, at 417 (explaining that “given the ease with which
foreigners can have their judgments recognized and enforced in U.S. courts, foreign
governments have no incentive to enter into a judgments treaty with the United States
because they have received a ‘free ride’ all along”) (citations omitted); see also Yaad
Rotem, The Problem of Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale
for the Law of Foreign Country Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505, 508 (2010).
186. See Yuan, supra note 115, at 781 (“The ideal and simple way to resolve this
problem is for the United States and China to recognize reciprocity in a bilateral or
multilateral treaty.”).
187. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-S. Kor., Nov.
28 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2217; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S-Greece,
Aug. 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829. Notably, both of these treaties were enacted in the 1950s.
188. See discussion supra Part I.A.
189. See Juenger, Money Judgments, supra note 149.
190. See generally Harris, Arbitration in China, supra note 134.
191. See id.; see also Chua, supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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China has some incentives to refuse such a treaty, the benefits to its
domestic industries may be greater through increased exposure to the
capital and consumer markets of the United States.
CONCLUSION
As trade and commerce between the United States and China
increases, cases of judgment unenforceability are likely to rise.
Judgment enforceability benefits parties from both nations, and a
bilateral or multilateral treaty may be the best way to resolve the issue.
A number of difficulties, however, have plagued prior efforts at such
treaties. Until such a treaty is enacted, or China reforms its judgment
enforcement practices, U.S. parties are advised to use great care in their
international dealings.

